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Abstract
The thesis mainly focuses on applying fuzzy and rough set theory to the mobile advertisement fraud detection. We first present an application of fuzzy set theory to implement
mobile advertisement anti-fraud systems. One of the main problems of mobile anti-fraud
is the lack of evidence to prove a user to be a fraudster. In this thesis, we implement an
application of fuzzy set theory to demonstrate how to detect cheaters. The advantage of
this method is such that the hardship in detecting fraudsters in small data samples can
be avoided. We achieve this by giving each user a suspicious degree showing how likely
the user is cheating and decide whether a group of users (like all users of a certain APP)
together could be fraudsters according to the average suspicious degree. This makes the
process more accurate as the data of a single user is too small to be predictable. We also
develop another method with the application of rough set theory. The advantage of the
second anti-fraud method proposed in this work is that the method is hard to counter.
It means that avoiding the detection of this method is very difficult for fraudsters. Ever
since smartphone and mobile internet became popular, mobile advertisement fraud and
anti-fraud have become two competitors both trying to suppress the other. Every time a
new fraud method is developed, a specially designed anti-fraud technique will come out
soon. After that new fraud methods will keep coming out to avoid being detected. The
second method in this paper has the potential of ending this circle. The method does not
target any fraud attempts, but it observes the differences between user groups. As long
as the fraudsters do not own related data of real user groups, it is almost impossible for
fraudsters to avoid being detected by this method.

v

Acknowledgments
Firstly, I would like to thank Dr. Xia and Dr. Getta. As supervisors they helped me find
my academic direction and corrected me in various mistakes. Secondly, I would like to
thank my parents for their mental and finical support. Last but not the least, I would like
to thank my girlfriend for her encouragement and accompany.

vi

Contents
Abstract

v

1

Introduction

1

2

Literature Review

4

3

Mobile Advertisement Fraud and Anti-Fraud
3.0.1 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 Mobile Fraud and Anti-Fraud Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6
6
7

4

The Application of Fuzzy Set Theory to Mobile Fraud Detection
4.1 Background of Fuzzy Set Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1.2 Application of Fuzzy Statistics on Anti-Fraud Methods
4.2 The Anti-Fraud Data Analyzing Process and Database . . . .
4.2.1 Introduction of The Main Process . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2.2 Process Origin Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2.3 Process Overactive Monitor . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2.4 Process New User Monitor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2.5 Table Sups Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3 Testing Log Generator and Test Result . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.1 Testing Log Generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.2 Test Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

The application of rough set theory to mobile advertisement fraud detection
5.1 Some Fraud Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2 Basic Rough Set Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.1 Some Basic Concepts of Rough Set Theory . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.2 An Example of Lower and Upper Approximation . . . . . . . . .
5.2.3 Rough Set Theory and Information Systems (Relational Tables) .
5.2.4 Dependency of Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.5 An Example of Dependency of Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . .
vii

10
10
10
11
11
11
12
12
17
17
17
17
20
21
21
22
22
22
24
25
25

CONTENTS
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6

Part Rough Set and Part Approximation . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.3.1 Example of Part Rough Set Dependency . . . . . . . . .
Application of Part Rough Set Theory to Mobile Fraud Detection
The algorithm to calculate the dependency metric . . . . . . . .
Analysis simulation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

viii
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

27
29
31
31
33

6

Possible Applications of Part Rough Set Theory

36

7

Summary and Conclusion

38

Bibliography

40

A Appendix
A.1 Diagram for Calculating The Dependency Metric . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42
42

Chapter 1
Introduction
According to an advertisement anti-fraud website called Beacon (https://www.thisisbeacon.com/),
advertisement fraud has cost a global loss of 35 billion dollars. As a matter of fact, the
damage of advertisement fraud is never only a financial loss but it also hurts the trust of
advertisers and ad serving platforms and seriously damages the whole industry.
This thesis focuses on applying mathematical theories to the detection of mobile ad
fraud. To achieve this goal, we will first give definitions of fraud actions and fraudsters.
Giving a proper definition of a mobile internet advertisement fraudster is never an easy
job. It is not only because of the differences between different fraud methods, but also
the differences in the intention of different fraudsters. Professional fraudsters aim to gain
profit from advertisers. Competitors may also try to consume competitive advertisers’
advertisement budgets. Besides all the above, the user-inducing apps have made the definition and detection of mobile internet fraud even more complicated.
This work will focus on the most common and most damaging fraud actions and fraudsters.
Profit-aiming fraud actions are defined as user actions (usually to be clicking the
advertisement) on mobile advertisements intend to gain profit from advertisements other
than being attracted to learn more about the information from them.
As no fraudster will use one single user account or IP address for cheating, they should
be defined on multiple users, namely a group of users.
Profit-aiming fraudsters are defined as groups of users that commonly perform profitaiming fraud actions.
In this work, we designed two methods to identify profit-aiming fraudsters. The first
one uses fuzzy set theory. By marking each event, user and app a degree of how suspicious
it is cheating, we avoid making a conclusion (fraudster or not) in small data samples.
Instead, we compare the difference of suspicious degree between different user groups
after collecting and computing the whole data sample.
The second method is an application of the rough set theory to mobile fraud detection.
We use the concept dependency of attributes to describe the difference between different
1
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user groups to identify the possible fraudsters. We also made an improvement to the rough
set theory so that it can be more suitable for big data analysis.
The reason behind this research is the hardship in the exact detection of fraudsters. As
the behavior of normal users is unpredictable, there is no way to very precisely distinguish
fraudsters from honest users. For example, a click rate can be used in fraud detection,
because a normal user’s click rate is usually less than 5%. But we cannot say that a user
is a fraudster if his or her click rate is higher than 5%. There is no number that could
categorically distinguish fraudsters from normal users.
To solve this problem, we propose to apply a method based on fuzzy set theory. If it is
hard to identify one fraud user, then we can calculate a suspicious degree of how likely
a user is cheating. It can be done for every user instead of dividing the users into two
categories.
Chapter 3 mainly focuses on using fuzzy set theory to measure how suspicious the
activities of a user or app can be. This measurement is called ’suspicious degree’. With
the calculation of suspicious degrees, we can avoid making a conclusion on a small data
sample, like one single user. Instead, we use the suspicious degrees to represent the most
important feature of one log or user and make a conclusion after the collection of all
suspicious degrees of a certain app or source.
Besides the work in Chapter 3, we also developed a method with the application of
rough set theory in Chapter 4.
As addressed in the definitions above, one of the most important differences between
normal user actions and fraudster actions is whether the user is interested in the advertisement. Thus, fraudsters can be detected as long as we know whether the users are
interested in the advertisements they clicked.
Although it is almost impossible to know whether every user is interested when they
click, it is not hard to analyze whether a group of people should be interested in an advertisement. For example, advertisements about video games are more attractive to young
people than elder people. Females should be more interested in makeup advertisements
than males. It may not be correct for a single user, but it is almost true for a large user
group. In this case, if the click rate of a video game advertisement on older people is
higher than it is on younger people for a given user group, this user group is very suspicious to be cheating.
As a matter of fact, a fraudster must run an APP to gain profit. In another word, when a
fraudster is cheating, then most of the ’users’ in the APP of the fraudster are nothing more
than different user accounts of the fraudster. Thus, to identify fraudsters, we do not need
to find out exactly which user account is cheating, we only need to find the suspicious
user group, namely the APP of the fraudster.
To analyze whether a user group is a fraudster, simply comparing the click rate between
older people and younger people or males and females are not accurate enough. This is
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because there could be many other attributes influencing the click rate. The best way is to
analyze the dependence of the user actions on attributes, like age or gender.
The definition of such dependency requires knowledge of rough set theory. In rough set
theory, an index called dependency can express how strong one certain group of attributes
is influenced by another. The dependency of click actions on attributes, such as age,
gender, platform or even price and brand of user’s device can show the user’s action. If
the dependency of two user groups on the same advertisement is different, then it is very
likely that one of the groups is a fraudster.
The dependency of attributes in the original rough set theory is not suitable enough for
modern big data analysis. Thus, we modified the rough set theory so that it better suits
big data analysis. In this work, we call it the part rough set theory.
The advantage of using dependency on mobile anti-fraud is such that this method focuses on the action of groups of people. One of the most serious hardships in anti-fraud
is that fraudsters change their ID and IP frequently, which makes it hard for an anti-fraud
process to track them down. However, as long as the new IDs and IPs are classified in the
same group (e.g. all users of an APP), changing ID or IP is meaningless for our method.
Another advantage of this method is that even if fraudsters are aware of this method,
it is still hard for them to avoid being detected. The best way to avoid being detected by
this method is to make the dependency similar to the dependency of a real user group.
Fraudsters, however, usually do not have enough real traffic, which means it is very hard
for them to get the essential data.
We also discussed other possible applications of part rough set theory in Chapter 5. We
believe it could be a tool for other problems in the big data analysis.

Chapter 2
Literature Review
In 2008, Vratonjic, N. et al. [15] discussed vulnerabilities of ad serving systems at that
time. The article also talked about how the vulnerabilities can be used by adversaries for
their own good and also a solution to the problem.
According to Vratonjic, N. et al. [15], online advertisements is the major revenue source
of the internet industry. This explains the importance of online advertisement anti-fraud
and mobile internet advertisement anti-fraud. The mobile advertisement fraudsters do not
only steal profit from advertisers, ad serving platforms and honest APP runners, but also
hurts the trust between them. The fraudsters are damaging the whole industry.
In an area of such importance, many researchers did their survey on it. Crussell, J. ,
R. Stevens and H. Chen [4] identified two types of fraud methods and developed a tool
targeting to analyze the fraudsters. Song, L et al. [10] focused on predicting and detecting
click fraud on large scale. Tian T. et. al. [12] described a specially designed anti-fraud
method against crowd fraud (device-based fraud in this article) and Oentaryo R et. al. [7]
used a method of data mining approach to detect click fraud on online advertisement.
Besides these references, there are also a few websites, that offer suggestions related to
fraud detection.
In 2020, Pooranian Z. et. al. [9] presented a comprehensive survey about the security
problems of online advertising. The article first talked about the difference between traditional advertising and online advertising, then gave a classification of different fraud
actions on online advertising systems. The article also categorized some solutions that
can be applied against advertising fraud.
Fuzzy set and rough set theories have been developing for decades. They have shown
great value in describing uncertainty.
The concepts of fuzzy set theory in this work mainly follow Buckley J. J. [1], like fuzzy
subset, fuzzy number and partialcut. Besides this, there are many other articles and books
talked about fuzzy set theory.
Mordeson J. N. [6] defined and explained fuzzy set, fuzzy mapping, fuzzy logic and
other contents. Uga- Rebrovs O. [14] made a specific description of the fuzzy random
4
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variable. Kandel A. et. al. [5] introduced fuzzy set, algebra and statistics detailly.
Suraj Z. [11] explained the rough set theory with simple language and easy- understanding examples. Q. Zhang et al. [17] gave a survey about the development of rough set
theory until 2016. Tsumoto and Shusaku. [13] talked not only about the history but also
possibilities in the future of rough set theory.
One of the references that are similar to this work is [3]. Cornelis Chris et al. [3]
reviewed the definitions in fuzzy rough set theory and their related properties. In this
work, we also made an improvement to rough set theory, we modified the definition of
lower and upper approximation so that the rough set theory can be more appliable for
modern big data analysis. In the work of [3], the lower and upper approximations are
defined on fuzzy sets, which makes the advantage of describing uncertainty even stronger
compared to the original fuzzy or rough set theory. Chris also discussed the application
of the fuzzy rough set theory like query refinement for searching on the WWW.
There is also another article that discussed a close topic to this work. Jerzy Blaszczy´nski
et al. [2] proposed a fraud detection method with the application of rough set theory in
the area of financial anti-fraud.

Chapter 3
Mobile Advertisement Fraud and
Anti-Fraud
Mobile advertisement fraud has been growing ever since mobile internet became popular.
From click redirection to user-inducing APPs, many different fraud methods have been
developed in the last decade. Some of these methods are easy to identify, while some
are not. Besides these, some methods are specially designed to avoid fraud detection.
These methods are making mobile anti-fraud a more and more challenging task for mobile
internet companies.
In this Chapter, we give definitions and examples of mobile advertisement fraud actions
and mobile advertisement fraudsters. Then different fraud methods and detecting methods
are introduced. After that, we discuss the limitations of anti-fraud methods nowadays.
Definition
We repeat the definitions in Chapter 1 here.
Profit-aiming fraud actions: User actions (usually to be clicking the advertisement)
on mobile advertisements intend to gain profit from advertisements other than being attracted to learn more about the information from them.
Mobile advertisement fraudster: A group of mobile users commonly perform mobile
advertisement fraud actions.
In the definitions above, fraud actions and fraudsters relate with intentions of gaining
profit. As a matter of fact, there are other types of unusual actions that can also be fraud
actions. For example, competitors can click opponents’ advertisements to consume their
budget. Such actions are not profit-aiming fraud actions. Actually, it can be called rare
compared to the frequency of profit-aiming fraud actions. Thus, we will focus on profitaiming fraudsters and fraud actions in this paper.

3.0.1

Example

The example below may help to get a better understanding of the problem.
6
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Suppose that Alice manages a mobile APP company with a large amount of traffic.
As Alice is rich in traffic, many advertisers wish to serve their advertisement on Alice’s
APP. This brings Alice much profit. Although Alice has already gained a lot from what
she already has, she always wants to get more. Unfortunately, the profit Alice could earn
is limited by her traffic. Alice cannot make more money without increasing her traffic.
Thus, to gain more profit, Alice comes up with two methods of increasing her ’traffic’.
The first method is to cheat through the generation of false traffic. Alice may choose
to do so, but the false traffic will increase the input-output rate of the advertisers. That
makes advertisers unwilling to cooperate in the future. In the long run, this is not a good
choice.
The second method is to build an advertisement serving platform. With such a platform,
Alice may serve advertisements to many other APPs that are willing to gain advertisement
budget from her. This method can bring real traffic and income to Alice. As a matter of
fact, not all APPs have enough traffic to attract advertisers. An advertisement serving
platform is now so popular that almost every large companies builds one of their own.
After comparing the two options, Alice chooses the second. She easily found that many
of APP runners would be happy to cooperate with her. Bob is one of them.
Bob is an APP runner with little traffic. Like Alice, he wishes to gain more profit.
Unlike Alice, he cannot build an advertisement serving platform. This is because he has
little traffic and fewer customers willing to advertise their products. His company is not
large enough to run a platform. Thus, Bob chooses to cheat. Bob generates fake traffic and
gains more profit than he should from Alice’s platform. This results in an increase in the
input-output rate of Alice’s customers. The advertisers lose their money for advertising on
fake traffic. Alice loses the trust of her customers. All because of the fraudster Bob. This
is why mobile fraud is damage to the interests of advertisers and the industry environment
of mobile internet at the same time.

3.1

Mobile Fraud and Anti-Fraud Methods

The mobile advertisement fraud methods have been developed almost since mobile internet became popular. As a result, there is a large number of different methods for the
implementation of fraud advertisements. These methods can be classified into three types
below.
• Fake users. The first method creates fake users. The fake users are not real human
users generated by fraudsters. There are two ways to generate a fake user.
Real device based fake user. It is also called a device farm, which is usually a
group of people working together, such that each person operates tens of devices at
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the same time. Such a method of fraud usually results in a high-cost event rate, density, and very short time difference between cost events. Sometimes, to avoid being
detected, fraudsters may reset the phone number, user ID, device ID, IP address
frequently. This will result in a high percentage of fake new users.
Server based fake users. This method requests and reports directly from the fraudster’s server to the advertiser’s or advertising server platforms without using any
smartphone device. In such a fraud method, nearly all the information related to
a user is generated by the server. Some fraudsters can even generate users so perfectly that the data looks even more ‘normal’ than real users’ data. The weak point
of such a method is that to avoid being identified, the fraudsters usually generate
new users too frequently. In this method, a ‘user’ may last less than one hour. Thus,
monitoring the density of the arrivals of new users can be used against such a fraud
method.
• Fake actions of real users. Fake actions of real users are a type of fraud methods,
that happen on real users’ smartphones. Fraudsters usually use their APPs installed
on real users’ smartphones to collect data and generate reports from fake actions
to gain profit from the advertisers. The fake actions may or may not happen, but
they are always not what the real users intend to do. This type of fraud method
was popular a few years ago but it has become rare now. Because such methods
usually require the users to install APPs on their devices with thew pretty awful
user experience. However, one of the methods called attribution misleading is still
frequently seen.
The attribution misleading method is a method focusing on cost per download or
cost per install advertisements. Cost per download (CPD) or cost per install (CPI)
are billing modes of advertisements, which is a billing mode that the advertisers
pay for only successful downloads or installs of users. One of the reasons why
advertisers would like to choose this billing mode is that advertisers usually have
the exact data of downloads and installs of their APPs. In the other words, data
of downloads and installs are usually trustworthy for the advertisers. Such billing
mode requires a logical attribute. When a downloading or installation happens, the
advertisers would check if there were any click events reported from the same user
a little bit earlier, usually no more than 24 hours. If there is no ‘click’ reported,
then advertisers would assume, that the download or install happened naturally.
If there is one ‘click’ report, then advertisers should pay for the downloads and
installations on the media that sent the report. If there is more than one media that
sent ‘click’ reports, then advertisers will choose one of the media to pay. In this
case, it is not wise for fraudsters to make fake downloads and installs since it is not
hard for advertisers to notice that there are many users from the same media who
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downloaded their APP but are not active at all. Thus, fraudsters tend to choose to
report a fake click when a real download is detected. Achieving this would mean
that they are almost definitely the last media who reported. To detect this fraud
method, each cost event of download type advertisement should be checked to see
if a cost event origin exists.
Some other fraud methods of this type include click redirection and forced click.
Click redirection happens mostly on mobile web, where a script could redirect a
user’s first click to the page or a hidden link to load an unexpected page.
Forced click is a fraud method that the whole screen is covered by an advertisement
without a clear close option. It forces the users to click on the advertisement.
In the advertisement stacking method, fraudsters hide advertisements behind an
advertisement, article, video, or anything displayed on their APPs. When a user
clicks what has been shown above, click events of all advertisements behind are
reported.
• Induced real actions of real users. Ever since 2018, some mobile technology
companies in China found it profitable to develop a type of APP that offers a little
bit of cash (a user gets less than 1 CNY a day if the user works really hard on the
APP) to the users in exchange for the users to click and read the advertisements on
their APPs. This kind of APP, usually called user-inducing APPs, has been proven
to be attractive to so-called ’sinking users’. These are the users commonly assumed
to be large in number and with low consumption power. Since the user-inducing
APPs have a really large group of target users, and also truly inspired the users to
be active, such APPs are much more profitable than normal APPs. Such APPs are
profitable for the developers, maybe also for the users, but not for the advertisers.
As is mentioned, the target users usually have low consumption power, they are
clicking the advertisement to gain money, not for the interest of the product. The
advertisers would like to pay for clicks because they believe that clicking shows
a chance, that a user would like to pay for the product, which is meaningless in
user-inducing APPs. Thus, even though both the actions and a user-inducing APP
are real, the APP developer is still a fraudster. As all the users are real, this fraud
method is the hardest to identify. Overactive monitoring might help, but clever
developers have learnt to encourage the users to act ’normally’. Choosing not to
cooperate with them may seem to be a good choice. But as they are rich in traffic,
they can always get a budget from other media or advertisement serving platforms.
In another word, advertisers will never know who ’sold’ their advertisement budget
to a user-inducing APP company.

Chapter 4
The Application of Fuzzy Set Theory to
Mobile Fraud Detection
4.1

Background of Fuzzy Set Theory

As it has been mentioned earlier in this paper, the exact identification of fraudsters is
usually impossible. In this case, fuzzy set theory can be helpful.

4.1.1

Definitions

We repeat the definitions of fuzzy subset, fuzzy number and α-cuts in [16] and [1] below.
Fuzzy Subset
Given a set A, a fuzzy subset B of A is defined by its membership function B(x) with
values in [0, 1] for all x in A. If B(x0 ) = 1, then x0 belongs to B. If B(x0 ) = 0, then x0 does
not belong to B. If B(x0 ) = h, where 0 < h < 1, then the membership degree of x0 in B is
h.
Triangular Fuzzy Number
Given three real numbers a < b < c, then a triangular fuzzy number N = (a/b/c) can be
defined as a fuzzy subset of R with membership function defined as below.

f (n) =



0



 b−x

b−a

c−x

1 − c−b



 0

(x ≤ a)
(a < x ≤ b)
(b < x ≤ c)
(x > c)

In this paper, other types of fuzzy number will not be discussed. Thus, when referring to
a fuzzy number, we assume, that it is always triangular fuzzy number.
10
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James J. Buckley also used the application of triangular fuzzy number in [?].
α −Cuts
Given a fuzzy number N, an α − cut of N is defined as N(α) = {x ∈ R|N(x) ≥ α} where
0 < α ≤ 1.

4.1.2

Application of Fuzzy Statistics on Anti-Fraud Methods

For example, consider the overactive check method. Let U be a set of all users recorded
in an hour. Let set O be the fuzzy subset of all overactive users in U. The membership
function of a user in a certain hour can be defined as
O(u) = max(min(1, max(0, 10s − MT D)),
min(1, costeventdensity × costeventrate)),

(4.1)

where MTD is the minimum time difference between two cost events (if exist). This
membership function will be called suspicious degree and it will be written as supsdegree. The suspicious degree of a user in an hour defined above is used to define the suspicious degree of an APP on a day. The suspicious degree of an APP on a day is an α −cut
of a fuzzy number: (min(sups − degree)/avg(sups − degree)/max(sups − degree)). This
is actually not typically a real α − cut of a fuzzy number, as the fuzzy number and the α
are both undefined. But given the circumstance, it is safe to assume that there exists such
a number and α satisfying the suspicious degree. This suspicious degree of an APP on
a day is the final result that determines the validity of a user. The avg(sups − degree)
will show how likely the whole APP is cheating, while the min(sups − degree) and
max(sups − degree) will show the behavior of normal users and fraudsters in the APP.

4.2

The Anti-Fraud Data Analyzing Process and Database

The main target of this paper is to find a method that can avoid making a conclusion at
the user level. The idea of the method, as introduced previously, comes from the fuzzy
set theory. To apply this method, we created an anti-fraud data analyzing process and its
supporting database.

4.2.1

Introduction of The Main Process

Three main processes are analyzing different types of fraudsters. The processes include
origin check process, overactive monitor process and new user monitor process. All
data obtained from the recording of the users’ activities are saved in 7 relational tables:
logs, origin-check, all-users, new-users, new-users-monitor and sups-result.

4.2. THE ANTI-FRAUD DATA ANALYZING PROCESS AND DATABASE
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The data flow diagram that overviews the entire anti-fraud data analysis process can be
seen in Fig. 4.1.

4.2.2

Process Origin Check

To identify attribution misleading fraudsters, we designed the origin check process. Each
time when a downloaded type log with event = coste vent, this process will check if a show
event log with the same ads id exists in the logs table. If not, the log is very suspicious
to be cheating. Otherwise, the process will calculate the sups degree accordingly to the
time difference between the show log and the cost event log, as it is also suspicious if the
time difference is rather small. This process starts each time when a log is updated to the
logs table. Related details can be seen in Fig. 4.2.
Algorithm 1 Origin Check
given a log updated to table logs
then log[x] is the value of element x of the given log
if log[event] = log[cost event] != ’show’
and log[ad type] = ’download’ then
select timestamp from logs
where ads id=log[ads id] and event=log[cost event]
if timestamp exist then
show exist ← 1
timedif ← log[timestamp]-timestamp
sups degree ← min(1, max(0, 1 - timedif/1000))
else
show exist ← 0
timedif ← 0
sups degree ← 1
end if
end if
insert into origin check values
(log[log id:event] + (show exist, timedif, sups degree))

4.2.3

Process Overactive Monitor

This process analyzes if any user is too active to be normal. Usually, users will not click
advertisements frequently. On the contrary, fraudsters would report cost event logs in
a much higher density. That would result in higher cost event rate, density and smaller
cost event time difference. The overactive monitor process will analyze these indexes to
identify the fraudsters. Every hour, the overactive monitor process will query data from
the table logs to analyze if users are overactive in the hour. Related detail can be seen in
Fig. 4.3 (all operations are only applied to the data of a certain hour).

4.2. THE ANTI-FRAUD DATA ANALYZING PROCESS AND DATABASE

Figure 4.1: Anti-fraud data analysis process.
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Figure 4.2: Process origin check.
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Algorithm 2 Overactive Monitor
query the database
let sel 1 be a tuple of cost event rate and density of every user in the logs table
each element of this tuple represents a user
for each tuple i in sel 1 do
timestamp = 0, min timedif = 1000000
if i[costEvent density] >= 2 then
query the database
let sel 2 be the tuple of timestamp of the given user’s all cost event logs whose
cost event is not show
each element of this tuple represents a cost event
for each tuple j in sel 2 do
min timedif ←
min(min timedif, j[timestamp] - timestamp)),
timestamp ← j[timestamp]
end for
sups degree ←
max(min(1, max(0, 1 - min timedif/10000)),
min(1, i[costEvent rate] * i[costEvent density]))
else
sups degree ← 0, min timedif ← 1000000
end if
insert into overactive values
(i+(min timedif, sups degree))
end for

4.2. THE ANTI-FRAUD DATA ANALYZING PROCESS AND DATABASE

Figure 4.3: Overactive monitor process.
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Process New User Monitor

The overactive process is effective against many fraudsters, but if the fraudsters, like
server based fraudsters, change their ID frequently, it is going to be hard for the overactive
process to collect enough data for analysis. In this case monitoring the percentage of new
users and cost events of new users, namely NU density and NU action density in the
process, could easily identify cheating APPs.
Every hour, the New User Monitor Process queries data from table logs to analyze
if any APP contains too many new users. Related detail can be seen in Fig. 4.4 (all
operations are only applied to data of a certain hour).
Algorithm 3 New User Monitor
query the database
let sel 1 be the tuple of users that showed up in logs but not in all users
each element of sel 1 is a user
update sel 1 to new users diagram
query the database
let sel 2 be the tuple of all users that showed up in logs
each element of sel 2 is a user
update sel 2 to all users diagram
query the database
let sel 3 be the tuple of new user density and new user action density of each app
each element of sel 3 represent an app
for i in sel 3 do
sups degree ←
max(i[NU density], i[NU action density])
insert into new user monitor values (i+(sups degree,))
end for

4.2.5

Table Sups Result

As a day passes, all results of the three processes will be collected and updated into
the sups result table, the table that contains the final result and offers the summarized
suggestion of the whole process. Since this table will be used in the next Chapter to show
the result of our text, the table will be specially introduced here in detail.
The columns of the sups result table are listed in the table 3.1.

4.3
4.3.1

Testing Log Generator and Test Result
Testing Log Generator

To test if the anti-fraud process is functional identifying fraudsters, we designed a generator that could simulate normal users and fraudsters.

4.3. TESTING LOG GENERATOR AND TEST RESULT

Figure 4.4: Process new user monitor.

18

4.3. TESTING LOG GENERATOR AND TEST RESULT

19

Table 4.1: Description of columns in sups result

Column
app id
date
OA min sups
OA avg sups
OA max sups
NU min sups
NU avg sups
NU max sups
OC min sups
OC avg sups
OC max sups
OC log num

Description
Unique identity of each APP.
Date when the event happened.
The minimum supsDegree in table
overactive.
The average supsDegree in overactive.
The maximum supsDegree in overactive.
The minimum supsDegree in table
new user monitor.
The
average
supsDegree
in
new user monitor.
The maximum supsDegree in
new user monitor.
The minimum supsDegree in table origin check.
The average supsDegree in origin check.
The maximum supsDegree in origin check.
The number of logs in the origin check.

The generator will create logs from 4 different apps, namely Alice, Bob, Chris, David.
Of the 4 apps, Alice is the only normal APP, with only real human behavior like users.
Bob is the attribution misleading fraudster, which has a lot of common users as Alice
and will always generate a cost event log if any of these common users reported a cost
event log of a download type advertisement on Alice. Apart from this, Bob is all the same
as Alice.
Chris is a sever based fraudster, with the rate of both cost event and new user generation
being much higher than Alice and Bob.
David is a device based fraudster, with the new user generation rate a little bit higher
and cost event generation rate much higher than Alice and Bob.
There’s another difference between the 4 apps. Since Alice and Bob contain mostly
human-like users, the time difference between different events of the 2 apps are a little
bit longer than Chris and David. Also, as Chris is a fully automatic sever based fraudster,
and David is supposed to be operated by a human, the time difference between events of
Chris is even shorter than David, being the shortest of the 4 APPs.

4.3. TESTING LOG GENERATOR AND TEST RESULT

4.3.2

20

Test Result

Table 3.2 and table 3.3 below are the results of the two tests.
Table 4.2: Test result 1

app
OA
OA
OA
NU
NU
NU
OC
OC
OC
OC

id
min
avg
max
min
avg
max
min
avg
max
num

Alice
0
0
0
4.9%
4.9%
4.9%
0
41.0%
81.0%
2

Bob
0
15.6%
1
7.2%
7.2%
7.2%
0
94.1%
1
70

Chris
0
4.9%
1
98.3%
98.3%
98.3%
0
2.2%
76.5%
206

David
0
64.6%
1
19.5%
19.5%
19.5%
0
1.6%
72.4%
147

Table 4.3: Test result 2

app
OA
OA
OA
NU
NU
NU
OC
OC
OC
OC

id
min
avg
max
min
avg
max
min
avg
max
num

Alice
0
0
0
10.5%
10.5%
10.5%
0
0
0
7

Bob
0
11.0%
1
8.5%
8.5%
8.5%
0
89.0%
1
51

Chris
0
4.3%
1
97.9%
97.9%
97.9%
0
2.4%
87.1%
199

David
0
66.8%
1
25.6%
25.6%
25.6%
0
4.2%
85.2%
185

According to the test, the process is functional as intended.

Chapter 5
The application of rough set theory to
mobile advertisement fraud detection
5.1

Some Fraud Methods

There are many different methods of cheating for mobile advertisement fraudsters. These
fraud methods belong to the three categories listed below.
• False Users
It is based on reporting logs to the advertising server that do not come from a real
human user but are generated either automatically by a fraudster’s server or manually by a smartphone device operated by a professional fraudster. Fraudsters using a
server to generate such cheating logs are called server-based fraudsters. Fraudsters
using real devices to cheat are called real-device-based fraudsters.
• False Actions on Real Users
It is based on reporting logs to the advertising server that comes from a real user
but against the user’s will. There are many different ways of achieving this, like
leaving users no other option than clicking on an advertisement or sending click
reports without real clicks.
• Induced Real Actions on Real Users
Some APPs nowadays would encourage the users to click advertisements by offering a small amount of profit. To gain profit, users using such APPs may click on
advertisements even if they are not interested. Such actions should also be considered as fraud actions since they bring no benefit to the advertisers.
Though there are many differences between fraudsters, there are two things in common.
• The fraudsters intend to gain profit, which is different from normal users.
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• A fraudster must run an APP so that fake data can be generated. That means it is
not necessary to identify which user is a fraudster but finding suspicious APPs will
be good enough for anti-fraud.

5.2
5.2.1

Basic Rough Set Theory
Some Basic Concepts of Rough Set Theory

The definitions in this section basically follows [8], [11], [17] and [13].
Approximation Space Given a set of objects U and R a subset of U 2 . Then U and R
can be called the universe and an indiscernibility relation. If R is an equivalence relation,
the pair (U, R) can be called an approximation space. In an approximation space (U, R),
given any x ∈ U, we use R(x) to denote the equivalence class determined by x. Lower
Approximation Given an approximation space (U, R) and a subset X of U, the lower
approximation of X with respect to R is
R∗ (X) = {x : R(x) ⊆ X}

(5.1)

Upper Approximation Given an approximation space (U, R) and a subset X of U, the
upper approximation of X with respect to R is
R∗ (X) = {x : R(x) ∩ X ̸= 0}
/

(5.2)

Accuracy of Approximation Given an approximation space (U, R) and a subset X of
U, the accuracy of approximation of X with respect to R is
αR (X) =

|R∗ (X)|
|R∗ (X)|

(5.3)

Membership Degree Given an approximation space (U, R) and an element x and a
subset X of U, the membership degree of x on X is
µXR (x) =

5.2.2

|R(x) ∩ X|
|R(x)|

(5.4)

An Example of Lower and Upper Approximation

Suppose we have a universe U and its subset S. (Fig. 5.1)
Given an equivalence relationship R of U that divides U into serveral equivalence
classes. These equivalence classes are the small squares in Fig. 5.2.
Thus, the green squares in Fig. 5.3 are the lower approximation of subset S. The upper
approximation of subset S is the shaded squares in Fig. 5.3.
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Figure 5.1: Universe and its subset S

Figure 5.2: Equivalence classes and subset S

Figure 5.3: Lower and Upper approximation of subset S
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Rough Set Theory and Information Systems (Relational Tables)

In the real world, data is usually stored in relational tables. To apply rough set theory to
real-world data analysis, we need to define relational tables, namely information systems.
Information System
An information system S is a pair S = (U, A), where U is a non-empty finite set of elements
and A is a non-empty finite set of attributes with the value map from U to the value of all
attributes in A. U is usually called the universe.
This definition may be kind of abstract, but it should be understandable if assuming S
to be a relational table, U to be the set of all rows in S and A to be all the columns.
To apply rough set theory to an information system, we need to build an approximation
space structure on it first. Thus, the definition of indiscernibility relation on information
systems is required.
Indiscernibility Relation
Given an information system S = (U, A) and B being a subset of A, the B-indiscernibility
relation (written as INDS (B)) can be defined as
INDS (B) = (x, x′ ) ∈ U 2 |∀a ∈ B, a (x) = a x′



(5.5)

where a(x) is the value of attribute a on element x.
As INDS (B) is a subset of U 2 , INDS (B) suits the definition of indiscernibility relation.
More importantly, it is obvious that INDS (B) is an equivalence relation. Thus, we have
successfully built an approximation space (U, INDS (B)) on the information system S =
(U, A).
Given an information system S = (U, A) and a subset B of A, we define the following
concepts.
Equivalent Class
For any x in U, the equivalent class x of B-indiscernibility relation is
[x]B = {x′ ∈ U|(x, x′ ) ∈ INDS (B)}

(5.6)

B∗ (X) = {x|[x]B ∈ X}

(5.7)

B∗ (X) = {x|[x]B ∩ X ∈
/ 0}
/

(5.8)

Lower Approximation

Upper Approximation

Accuracy of Approximation
αB (X) =

|B∗ (X)|
|B∗ (X)|

(5.9)
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Membership Degree
µXB (x) =

5.2.4

|[x]B ∩ X|
|[x]B |

(5.10)

Dependency of Attributes

The main goal of fraud detection is to detect “unusual people”. Theoretically, the behavior
of different user groups should be similar as long as the user groups are large enough.
Thus, if the behaviors between two user groups are quite different, at least one of the two
user groups is “unusual”, which means very likely to be cheating.
This was only a theoretical method for anti-fraud in the past, as there was no index
qualified for this job. In rough set theory, there is an index very suitable to express user
behavior for fraud detection. This index is called the dependency of attributes.
Dependency of Attributes
Given an information system S = (U, A) and C, D being a subset of A, the dependency of
attributes C on attributes D in the universe of U is defined as
kU (C, D) =

| ∪X∈U/D C∗ (X) |
|U|

(5.11)

The dependency of attributes shows the accuracy when using one set of attributes to represent another set of attributes. In the real world, it could describe how strong one set of
attributes can influence another set of attributes. If the dependency of D on C equals one,
then the values of D are fully determined by the values of C. If the dependency equals
zero, then C does not influence the value of D.
As mentioned, the behavior of different user groups is supposed to be similar. It is
safe to assume that the influence of some attributes, like age or gender of users, on the
behavior of users, like whether they like to click on an advertisement is stable in different
user groups. With this assumption, we can use the dependency to detect fraudsters. If
the dependency of a click event on a group of attributes is quite different in different user
groups, then one of the user groups contains some fraudsters. This is the basic idea of this
work.

5.2.5

An Example of Dependency of Attributes

Given an information system S = (U, A), let c, d be elements of A.
As shown in Fig. 5.4 the attribute c has two possible values 1 and 2.
The attribute d has three possible values 1, 2 and 3. (Fig. 5.5)
To put attributes c and d together. (Fig. 5.6)
Let C = c and D = d. Then the dependency of C on D in U is the cardinality of sets in
grey divided by the cardinality of the universe in Fig. 5.7.
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Figure 5.4: Attribute c on the universe

Figure 5.5: Attribute d on the universe

Figure 5.6: Attributes c and d in the universe

Figure 5.7: The dependency of c on d in the universe
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Part Rough Set and Part Approximation

In the previous Chapter, we introduced the basic concepts of rough set theory and the
definition of the dependency of attributes. We also introduced a new idea of how to use
dependency to detect fraudsters. However, the dependency of attributes cannot be used
directly in big data analysis, as there is one serious problem.
The definition of dependency used the concept of lower approximation. In the definition
of lower approximation, an equivalence class is a part of the lower approximation only
when it is a subset of the target set, which means that there can be no element outside of
the target set. However, in big data analysis, since the data is too large, any possibility
could happen. This could cause errors when calculating the dependency.
Suppose there is an advertisement for PC games. As it is a game advertisement, youngsters are more likely to click it while older people will usually ignore it. In this case,
the dependency of whether a user clicks the advertisement on the age of users should be
high. If the data sample is large enough, there’s a possibility that some youngsters did
not click the advertisement and some elder people clicked the advertisement. In this case,
the dependency could be zero only because a few people behave differently from other
people. This is the limitation of the rough set theory.
An imaged example of this issue could be seen in Fig. 5.8.

Figure 5.8: Example

In Fig. 5.8, suppose each small square in the picture is an equivalence class. Then the
lower approximation of the circle is empty. However, the square in the middle is almost
a subset of the circle. There is only a very small part out of the circle. In this case, using
the vanilla definition of lower approximation is not good enough to solve problems.
Thus, an improvement to the definitions is essential.
Part of Set
Given a finite set A and a real number a ∈ [0, 1], then the pair (A, a) can be called a part
of A.
The Cardinality of a part of set
Given a part of set (A, a), then the cardinality of this part of set is
|(A, a)| = |A| ∗ a

(5.12)
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Union of parts of sets
Given (A, a) and (B, b) to be two parts of sets. If A ∩ B = 0,
/ then the union of the two
parts is
|A| ∗ a + |B| ∗ b
(A ∪ B,
)
(5.13)
|A| + |B|
Inner part
Given a set U and A, B to be its subsets. The inner part of B in A is
I(A,B) = (B,

|A ∩ B|
)
|B|

(5.14)

where A is called the source-set and B is called the cut-set.
Outer part
Given a set U and A, B to be its subsets. The outer part of B in A is
O(A,B) = (B, 1 −

|A ∩ B|
)
|B|

(5.15)

The subtraction of inner and outer parts
Given a set U and A, B to be its subsets. The subtraction of the inner and outer parts of B
in A is
|A ∩ B|
|A ∩ B|
− (1 −
)))
I(A,B) − O(A,B) = (B, max(0,
|B|
|B|
(5.16)
2 ∗ |A ∩ B| − |B|
= (B, max(0,
))
|B|
|A ∩ B| |A ∩ B|
−
))
|B|
|B|
|B| − 2 ∗ |A ∩ B|
= (B, max(0,
))
|B|

O(A,B) − I(A,B) = (B, max(0, 1 −

(5.17)

Part Lower Approximation
Given an approximation space (U, R) and a subset A of U, the part lower approximation
of A with respect to R are two coupled sets defined below
R (A) = UX∈ U (I(A,X) − O(A,X) )
R

(5.18)

Part Upper Approximation
Given an approximation space (U, R) and a subset X of U, the part upper approximation
of X with respect to R are two coupled sets defined as below
R̄ (A) = UX∈ U (O(A,X) − I(A,X) )
R

(5.19)

Part Dependency of Attributes
Given an information system S = (U, A) and C, D being subsets of A, the dependency of
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attributes C on attributes D in the universe of U is defined as
k (C, D) =

∑X∈ U (|D(X)|)
C

|U|

(5.20)

We define part dependency in this way because for any X ∈ UC and Y ∈ UD , if Y is a
subset of X, then the two definitions are the same in the case of X and Y, but if Y is not
a subset of X, the part dependency will ignore Y and X like the dependency in rough set
theory. This would result in part dependency being more accurate, as it also considers the
cases of most of Y is in X, but Y is not a subset of X.

5.3.1

Example of Part Rough Set Dependency

Given an information system S = (U, A). Let c, d be elements of A. As shown in Fig. 5.9
the attribute c has two possible values 1 and 2.

Figure 5.9: Attribute c in the universe

The attribute d has three possible values 1, 2 and 3. (Fig. 5.10)

Figure 5.10: Attribute d in the universe

To put attributes c and d together. (Fig. 5.11)
Let C = c and D = d. Then the part dependency of c on d in U is the subsection of the
cardinality of sets in green and sets in yellow divided by U in Fig. 5.12, Fig. 5.13 and
Fig. 5.14.
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Figure 5.11: Attribute c and d in the universe

Figure 5.12: Part dependency

Figure 5.13: Part dependency

Figure 5.14: Part dependency
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5.4

Application of Part Rough Set Theory to Mobile Fraud
Detection

In Chapter 1, the mobile fraud actions are the actions that intend to gain profit. It is easy to
see from this definition, the main difference between normal user action and fraud action
is the intention. The normal user actions come from the user’s interests, such actions
are influenced by attributes of the user likes, age or gender. On the contrary, the fraud
actions are not dependents on the user’s attributes as normal user actions. In other words,
the dependency of a click event on attributes, such as age, gender or location should be
different in the universe of normal users and the universe of fraudsters.
To make the result more accurate, we will use a dependency metric for fraud detection.
Given a data set with data of user action of click or not and attributes of users of age,
gender, platform and location. The dependency metric of user group A is in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Dependency metric

ad ID
0001
0002
0003

D age
xxx
xxx
xxx

D gender
xxx
xxx
xxx

D platform
xxx
xxx
xxx

D location
xxx
xxx
xxx

main D
xxx
xxx
xxx

According to the definition of part dependency of attributes, two attribute sets C, D and
the universe U all influence the dependency. In the dependency metric, D xxx means the
dependency of a click event on attribute xxx, while the main D means the dependency
of a click event on all attributes. The first column ad ID represents the universe. For
example, if ad ID equals 0001, then the universe is of the user group A on advertisement
0001.

5.5

The algorithm to calculate the dependency metric

Given a user group A and an ad ID, the process first inquiry the database for logs of
the user group and advertisement. After obtaining the logs, the following algorithm will
compute the dependency metric. (Fig. 5.15)
To calculate the dependencies in the dependency metric, we use Algorithm 1 to perform Dependency Calculation.
When dealing with real data, the number of logs with click=1 will be much smaller
than logs with click=0. That would cause the dependency to be too small to study. The
solution to this problem is easy. We can put a higher weight on the logs with click=1 will
fix it.

5.5. THE ALGORITHM TO CALCULATE THE DEPENDENCY METRIC

Figure 5.15: The process
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Algorithm 4 Dependency Calculation
input logs and attributes
for a in all possible values of given attributes do
c[a] = number of logs with attributes=a and click=1
nc[a] = number of logs with attributes=a and click=0
m[a] = abs(c[a] - nc[a])
end for
return dependency = sum(m)/(number of given logs)
Detailed information of this algorithm is listed in the Appendix.

5.6

Analysis simulation results

As mentioned in Chapter 2, identifying suspicious APPs will be enough for fraud detection. Thus, we designed five different APPs in our test. Some of them are normal, and
others are fraudsters. Users in different APPs have different possibilities to ‘click’ on
advertisements.
In the real world, different advertisements have different targeted users. Different attributes also have different influences on whether targeted users will click or not. Such
actions are not easy to be simulated by fraudsters. The server based fraudster may identify
the targeted users of an advertisement, but it is almost impossible for fraudsters to know
the difference between different attributes.
To simulate this phenomenon, we designed a series of columns for advertisements
called the power of attributes. There is a column for each attribute to describe how strong
the attribute can influence the possibility of normal users clicking the advertisement. We
designed three advertisements for the simulation. The values of power of attributes for
each advertisement are listed in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Advertisements

ad ID
0001
0002
0003

age
10
10
1

gender
10
10
1

platform
1
10
1

location
1
10
1

To verify our fraud detecting process, we designed five different APPs to represent
normal APPs or fraudsters. Related information on each APP and the test results are in
Table 2.
APP1 is a normal APP. Users in APP1 are more likely to click if they are targeted users
of an advertisement. Also, different attributes have different powers to influence whether
targeted users click or not. These rules are both applied in APP1.
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The dependency metric of APP1 is in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Dependency Metric of APP1

ad ID
0001
0002
0003

D age
0.388
0.331
0.056

D gender
0.324
0.345
0.058

D platform
0.042
0.316
0.027

D location
0.055
0.390
0.053

D main
0.435
0.560
0.141

APP2 is a server based fraudster. The users in APP2 are false users. Their actions are
different from normal users like APP1. Targeted users in APP2 are more likely to click,
but there’s no difference in the power of different attributes.
The dependency metric of APP2 is in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Dependency Metric of APP2

ad ID
0001
0002
0003

D age
0.212
0.213
0.246

D gender
0.241
0.226
0.218

D platform
0.207
0.237
0.218

D location
0.204
0.190
0.177

D main
0.373
0.375
0.368

APP3 is a real device based fraudster. All cheating actions are operated by real humans.
The actions of targeted users in APP3 are the same as other users.
The dependency metric of APP3 is in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Dependency Metric of APP3

ad ID
0001
0002
0003

D age
0.021
0.006
0.013

D gender
0.012
0.001
0.001

D platform
0.018
0.010
0.009

D location
0.018
0.010
0.009

D main
0.057
0.042
0.047

APP4 is a user-inducing APP. Half of the users in APP4 behave like users in APP1, and
the other half behave like users in APP3.
The dependency metric of APP4 is in Table 5.6.
APP5 is also a normal APP. All the behaviors are set to be the same as APP1.
The dependency metric of APP5 is in Table 5.7.
According to the test results, APP1 and APP5 are similar. It suits our assumption that
APP1 and APP5 are both normal APPs.
As a result of APP2, since APP2 is a server-based fraudster, it can identify the target
users for each app. Thus the dependency of each attribute is not as small as APP3 or
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Table 5.6: Dependency Metric of APP4

ad ID
0001
0002
0003

D age
0.065
0.052
0.007

D gender
0.047
0.064
0.006

D platform
0.006
0.074
0.007

D location
0.003
0.055
0.013

D main
0.095
0.113
0.063

Table 5.7: Dependency Metric of APP5

ad ID
0001
0002
0003

D age
0.338
0.344
0.017

D gender
0.339
0.340
0.073

D platform
0.039
0.348
0.066

D location
0.062
0.336
0.057

D main
0.404
0.562
0.149

APP4. But as APP2 is not aware of the power of each attribute, different attributes have
little difference in the result. APP3 and APP4 are similar, as they both contain real device
based fraudster, the influence of attributes are so small that the dependencies are all nearly
zero.
Thus, the test result shows that our process has the potential ability to detect fraudsters. The difference between the power of different attributes and advertisements is too
idealized. Whether one can find advertisements as good as they are in the simulation is
still a question. In conclusion, the algorithm is useful in mobile anti-fraud, but it is not a
practical method yet. To be applied in the real world, there are more work and tests to be
done.

Chapter 6
Possible Applications of Part Rough Set
Theory
As a theory specially designed for modern mobile internet big data analysis, the part rough
set theory, especially part dependency, can be applied not only on anti-fraud processes,
but also many other areas involve big data analysis.
• Reducing or endowing weight to the dimensions of parameters for machine
learning.
Machine learning technology is used in the mobile internet industry in almost every
area. The CTR Model, for example, usually requires supervised learning technology. The function of the CTR Model is to predict the possibility of a certain user
clicking on a certain advertisement, article or anything that shows on an APP. This
model is essential for mobile APP companies, as it is the core of personalized push
systems. A good CTR Model can always send users what they are interested in,
which brings a really good user experience.
In the commercialization area, CTR Model is not only important for user experience
but also related directly to the profit of advertisements. One of the most common
types of billing for mobile advertising is the cost per click billing type, meaning
that the mobile APP company will not gain any income unless a user clicks an
advertisement. In this case, sending users advertisements that do not catch their
interest is not profitable. Thus, increasing the accuracy of the CTR Model would
benefit both user experience and advertising profit.
As suggested in the previous Chapters, the part dependencies of an advertisement’s
click rate are different with different attributes. For example, the dependency of a
make-up advertisement’s click rate on age is probably smaller than the dependency
on gender. Such difference is different for different advertisements and has not been
applied. Thus, if the dependency on a certain attribute is high, we endow a higher
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weight on the attribute. On the other hand, if the dependency is very low, we may
consider removing the attribute.
• Data analysis support for advertisers
In the mobile advertising area, data analysis is very important for advertisers to
gain a better input-output rate. Advertisers need to decide which group of users
they would like to advertise to and which group of users they would not advertise
to. If an advertiser decides to show an advertisement to every user on a certain APP,
then the advertiser will probably pay for a lot of traffic that does not belong to their
target users. If the advertiser decides to advertise only to a small group of users, the
advertiser may miss a large number of potential customers.
To deal with this situation, data analysis is important for advertisers. The part dependency of attributes may be of great help for it. Nowadays, when advertisers are
analyzing data, they are capable of learning whether elder people are more interested in their advertisement, but it is hard to learn whether gender has a stronger
influence on the users’ attitude than age. Part dependency is a good fit for this role.
• Membership degree for fuzzy tagging
Mobile internet personalized push system requires giving tags for users. Usually,
many users value their privacy and would share their personal information on the
internet. In this case, some companies would use algorithms to tag the users with
different attributes like age or gender. These attributes are valued by algorithms.
They are not always accurate. Thus, giving the tags an index showing how likely
the tag is true would be helpful for further data analysis.
With the data that comes from real users who agree to share their personal information, we can use the membership degree from part rough set theory to describe how
likely the user belongs to a certain user group, namely how likely a certain tag is to
be true. This process can be called fuzzy tagging.
With fuzzy tagging, the membership degree can be applied to the CTR Model. If a
user is not 100% likely to be a male, then a lower weight should be put on the user
when advertising an advertisement targeting only males.

Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusion
In this work, we presented two methods for mobile advertisement fraud detection. First,
we introduced the techniques used for mobile advertisement fraud. Then in Chapter 3 we
applied fuzzy set theory to detect these fraud methods. As one of the most severe hardships is that there is little evidence to prove whether a user is a fraudster, this method aims
to solve the problem using the application of fuzzy set theory. By measuring how likely
a log, user or app is cheating, identifying fraudsters no longer has to be 100% accurate.
Instead, the suspicious degree could offer a numerical view for advertisers to analyze
fraudsters. This method can be an effective solution for mobile internet advertisement
anti-fraud systems.
In Chapter 4, we presented an improvement of the rough set theory called part rough set
and its application on the mobile ad anti-fraud. The method calculates and compares the
part dependency metric of different user groups on different advertisements. By testing
different user groups with different advertisements, the dependency metric can identify
fraudsters without worrying about the differences between cheating methods. There is
also another advantage of this method. As the main objective of this method is to compare
the dependency metric, it would be impossible for fraudsters to pretend to be a normal
user group as long as they do not have the dependency metric data of real user groups.
Since fraudsters usually have little real traffic, it is safe to assume that the fraudsters
will not be able to gain the data. Besides, anti-fraud programmers can always use new
advertisements for the dependency metric, which means the anti-fraud programmers will
become the initiative with the help of the method in this paper.
The method has strong advantages, however, it is still not practical enough for real
application. When applied to the real world, as the test data are generated, we are not sure
if the dependency metrics of different user groups are different as they are in the test. If
the difference between dependency metrics is small, it won’t be strong enough for fraud
detection. In that case adjustments like using advertisements with higher dependency or
adding more attributes to the dependency metric may fix the problem.
We also discussed some other possible applications of part rough set theory in Chapter
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5. As it is designed specifically for big data analysis, there are strong potentials in it.
In brief, the thesis presented two mobile advertisement anti-fraud methods. The two
methods used different mathematical theories, but both have the potential in the mobile
advertisement anti-fraud area.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1

Diagram for Calculating The Dependency Metric

As mentioned in Chapter 5, the detailed diagram for the calculation of the dependency
metric is so large that we decide to address it as an appendix. If any reader is interested,
the diagram is in the next two pages.
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A.1. DIAGRAM FOR CALCULATING THE DEPENDENCY METRIC

Figure A.1: Part I
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A.1. DIAGRAM FOR CALCULATING THE DEPENDENCY METRIC

Figure A.2: Part II
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